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Foregoing Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: 
Some Recent Legal and Moral Implications 
for Catholic Health Care Facilities 
Scott T. Helsper and Rev. Jeremiah J. McCarthy 
Mr. Helsper is allorney and vice-president / legal services for Vincentian 
Health Services in Los Angeles. Father McCarthy is academic 
dean / associate professor of moral theology at St. John's Seminary, 
Camarillo, California. 
Due to the confusion concerning the state of the law regarding artificial 
nutrition and hydration, we propose to review some of the significant legal 
opinions and to outline some of the possible options for Catholic health 
care facilities in attempting to respond to the legal and ethical dimensions 
involved. 
Until just a few short years ago, the mere suggestion, much less the actual 
act, of discontinuing the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration to a 
hospital patient would have sent shock waves through the medical and legal 
communities. This reaction was understandable because the provision of 
artificial nutrition and hydration was regarded not as just another 
treatment modality, but as basic, non-negotiable comfort care which would 
be provided as long as the patient was alive. ' 
The movement away from artificial nourishment accelerated when 
Barber vs. Superior Court was decided in 1983. J This case involved two Los 
Angeles physicians who were being prosecuted for murder because they 
withdrew the artificial nutrition and hydration from a comatose adult 
patient, Clarence Herbert. In the appeal decision which exonerated the 
physicians, the justices refused to distinguish between artificial nutrition 
and hydration and artificial breathing or ventilator support: 
Medical nutrition and hydration may not always provide net benefits to patients. 
Medical procedures to provide nutrition and hydration are more simi lar to other 
medical procedures than to typical human ways of providing nutrition and 
hydration. Their benefits and burdens ought to be evaluated in the same manner as 
any other medical procedure.' 
The standard to be applied to evaluate the benefits and burdens of 
medical procedures including artificial nutrition and hydration, according 
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to the Barber decision. is whether the continued treatment is proportionate 
or disproportionate to the patient's recovery to cognitive and sapient life: 
Proportionate treatment is that which. in view of the patient has at leas t a 
reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient. which benefits outweigh 
the burdens attendant to the treatme nt. ) 
The court continues:. 
A treatment course which is onlv minimally painful or intrusive ma y nonetheless 
be considered disproportionate to the potential benefit s if the prognosis is 
virtua ll y hopeless for any significant improvement in condit ion." 
In 1984. while not directly addressing nutrition and hydration. the 
California Court of Appeals in the Bartling decision extended the right to 
refuse disproportionate treatment to a competent. non-comatose adult 5 
This case was brought by the patient's wife who was seeking a court order 
to have the hospital remove a n artificial breathing device. The court held 
that the right to refuse treatment was based on the constitutiona l right of 
privacy and was. in thi s case. superior to the interests of the state in 
preserving life. protection of innocent third parties. prevention of suicide 
and the preservation of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 
In 1985. the Supreme Court of New Jersey. the same court that decided 
the Karen Ann Quinlan case. in the Maffer of" Conror . directly addressed 
the issue of artificial nutrition and hydration in an incompetent. non-
comatose patient. 6 This court approved the foregoing of art ificial feed ing 
from Claire Conroy. an 84-year old bedridden woman who was 
incompetent. institutionalized with severe a nd permanent mental and 
physical impairments and had a limited life expectancy. The Barher. 
Bartling. and Conrot' cases laid the groundwork fora 1986case. BOllI'ia 1'.1'. 
Superior Court . which put an end to the rationale that artific ial nutrition 
and hydration were non-negotiable comfort care l 
The Bouvia Case 
Eli zabeth Bouvia is a competent . non-comatose ad ult. She is a cerebral 
palsy victim who has been a quadriplegic since birth. She has been married 
and divorced. was pregnant but suffered a miscarriage. Three years ago. 
while in a Riverside. California hospital. she sought a court order directing 
the hospital to withdraw her artificial nutrition and hydration . and to keep 
her comfortable while she starved herself to death. The court refused to 
grant such an order and Ms. Bouvia eventually left the hospital. She lived 
with family and friends until December. 1985 when she was admitted to a 
Los Angeles County Medical Facility . While there her weight dropped and 
artificial nourishment was begun without Ms. Bouvia's consent because 
her condition was judged to be life-threatening by the physicians. She 
again went to court, but this time asked for an order to withdraw art ificial 
nutrition and hydration in order to be relieved of the burden of that 
treatment. She denied that she wa s again intent upon suicide and stated 
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that she would take liquids normally if the artificial measures were 
discontinued. The trial court did not believe Ms. Bouvia and refused to 
grant her requested order. Ms. Bouvia appealed that decision. 
On April 16, 1986. the California Court of Appeal reversed the decision 
of the trial court. stating that a competent adult patient has the right to 
refuse any medical treatment or medical service, even when such treatment 
is labeled "furnishing nourishment and hydration" and even if its exercise 
creates a "life threatening condition."x Calling this right to refuse medical 
treatment "basic and fundamental" and "part of the right of privacy 
protected by both the state and federal constitutions" , the appellate court 
ruled that it "requires no one's approval" and is not "subject to being 
overridden by medical opinion". This court further ruled that a 
"constitutionally guaranteed right must not be abridged" and that "it 
matters not what its exercise". 
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Compton joined in the 
majority decision but, unlike the majority, directly addressed the issue of 
suicide .9 After observing that the majority opinion danced around the 
issue , Justice Compton stated that the " right to die is an integral part of our 
right to control our own destinies so long as the rights of others are not 
affected" . He further added that this right should "include the ability to 
enlist assistance from others , including the medical profession, in making 
death as painless and quick as possible". 
This decision stunned not only the medical community but others 
including the County of Los Angeles which petitioned the California 
Supreme Court to review the case and to stay the decision pending the 
review. The Supreme Court , on June 5, 1986, refused to review the case 
and thereby let the decision stand . 
The above review of some recent court cases indicates the complex 
assessment of values which enters into the legal appraisal of withdrawal of 
medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration . Entering 
into this assessment are such concerns and "proportiop ate or dispro-
portionate care", the value of patient autonomy, and legitimate state 
interests concerning the protection of human life . From a Catholic moral 
perspective, it is important to offer some reflections on these legal 
developments . 
The terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means have enjoyed a long 
provenance in the ethical literature . However, there is an inescapable 
ambiguity inherent in the terms since consideration of perspective 
influences the extent to which medical treatments are deemed " ordinary" 
or "extraordinary". For example, from one perspective , namely the 
physician's, "ordinary" means are those dictated by the state of current 
technology. From the patient's perspective, however, a different 
perception can emerge. That is, "ordinary" means would constitute those 
measures which are minimally invasive and confer some discernible 
benefit irrespective of technical merit. Classically, the distinction between 
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" means has been elaborated from the 
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viewpoint of the patient on the basi s ofa " benefit- burden" test , that is, if 
the treatment does not confer a discernible benefit to the patient , or results 
in intolerable burden, the treatment may be refusable or "optional" and 
hence , "extraordinary". 
Adoption of Terms 
In order to obviate some of the confusion surrounding the terms 
"ordinary" and "extra·ordinary", practitioners of ethics have adopted the 
terms "proportionate" and "disproportionate." This terminology appears 
not only in the Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia (1980), but also in the 
President's Commission Report, DecidinK to Forego LiFe-Sustaining 
Treatment (March, 1983).1 0 Discerning the proper "proportion" or 
" measure" of treatment requires careful ethical judgment in order to make 
the appropriate decisions about continuing or foregoing treatment. The 
merit of thi s la ng uage is that it focuses attention on the patient's total 
condition in order to assess whether treatment is obligatory or optional. If 
the treatment isjudged to be "di spro portiona te" and hence optional, there 
is no obligation to continue the treatme nt. Moralists Kevin O'Rourke a nd 
Dennis Brodeur highlight thi s point: 
If the mea ns arc determined from an ethi ca l point of view to be ex traordinary 
[i.e .. disproportionate]. they mayor may not be e mployed. " 
In a recent statement publi shed by the Committee for Pro-Life 
Activities of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, this perspective 
was held to be in keeping with the Church's moral tradition: 
We maintain that o ne is obliged to use ··ordinary" means of preserving life- tha t 
is. means whic h ca n c1Tectively prese rve life wit hout imposing gra ve burde ns on 
the patient and we see the failure to supply such means as "equivalent to 
eut hanasia" . But we also recognize a nd defend a patient's right to refuse 
"ex tra ordi na ry'· means- that is. mea ns which provide no benefit or which 
in vol ve too gra ve a burden." 
We judge that these criteria provide some helpful gu idance for the 
difficult questions concerning artificial nutrition and hydration , as well as 
the complex questions concerning withdra wal of life support presented by 
the Bouvia case. 
Rather than focusing on the technology of artificial nutrition and 
hydratio n, we suggest that it may be more helpful to focus on the pa tient in 
order to determine whether or not the provision of artificial nutrition and 
hydrat ion co nstitutes a burden or a benefit for the patient. The Christian 
notion of stewardship recogni zes our responsibility to make reasonable 
provision for our physical , emotional and spiritual needs. Moreover, the 
notion of being a good "steward" implicitly recognizes that there are limits 
to the stewa rd ship of our bodies. To make thi s claim is not to endorse an 
instrume nta l o r utilitarian view of the body, but rather to recognize that 
bod il y life may not be well served by secu ring its maintenance at the cost of 
o ther huma n goods. That is, at times we may find ourselves not in the 
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position of prolonging life, but rather of prolonging the dying process. 
Under most circumstances, provision of artificial feeding and hydration 
will be given in order to express our commitment to the good of the patient 
and as an expression of our commitment to the symbolic value of 
nourishment as an expression of our obligations to care for human life. 
However, there may be some circumstances which call for a different 
assessment. For example, the patient who experiences great pain and 
discomfort with the feeding tube, or the terminally ill person who 
invariably becomes anorexic as the disease process takes its toll , or the 
patient whose protracted and irreversible coma offers no hope for any 
prognosis of recovery, can conceivably be viewed as nOI benefitting from 
the provision of artificial nourishment. 
Explanation of Circumstances 
It seems to us that a reasonable interpretation of the meaning of 
"ordinary" or "proportionate" measures dictates the removal of the 
feeding tube when the circumstances have rendered it "extraordinary" or 
"disproportionate". The presence of pain or discomfort is not sufficient in 
and of itself to constitute such justifying circumstances. The criterion of 
"burden" to the patient must be such that in the particular circumstances 
of the patient, life's goals are no longer reasonably attainable. We judge 
that Father Kevin O'Rourke has captured this dimension well in his recent 
remarks: 
One of the basic ethical assumptions upon which medicine and all efforts to nurse 
and feed people is based is that there is an obligation to prolong life because living 
enables us to pursue the purpose of life . Does this obligation ever cease? Clearly, it 
would cease if prolonging life no longer enables one to strive for the purpose of 
life. If efforts to prolong life are useless insofar as pursuing the purpose of life is 
concerned, or if prolonging life results in a severe burden for the patient insofar as 
pursuing the puroose of life is concerned. then the ethical obligation to prolong 
life is no longer present. 13 
A similar perspective can be seen in a recent statement p'ublished by the 
Committee for Pro-Life Activities of the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops: 
We maintain that one is obliged to use "ordinary" means of preserving life, that is, 
means which can effectively preserve life without imposing grave burdens on the 
patient, and we see the failure to provide such means as "equivalent to 
euthanasia" . . . But we also recognize and defend a patient's right to refuse 
"extraordinary" means, that is means which provide no benefit or which involve 
too grave a burden." 
Father O'Rourke further specifies the application of these principles to 
the question of tube feeding, by appealing to the classic moral notion that 
"nemo tenetur ad inutile," that is, "No one is obliged to useless means" 
concerning medical treatment. The notion of "burden" is an important 
consideration, but in the case of irreversible coma, the notion that the 
treatment is "useless" due to loss of cognitive function, is more significant. 
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To pursue the purpose of life , one needs some degree of cognitive-affective 
function . Hence, if efforts to restore or develop cognitive-affective function can 
be judged useless and a fatal pathology is present , the person may be allowed to 
die because prolonging life would not enable the individual to strive for the 
purpose of life. ls 
It is clear that careful , prudent judgment is necessary concerning the 
issue of artificial nutrition and hydration. Withdrawal of treatment , as the 
citation from the Committee for Pro-Life Activities indicates, must not 
cross the line into endorsement of euthanasia. A particular aspect of recent 
court cases, notably Bouvia. is the alarming tendency to inflate the notion 
of patient autonomy to encompass a suicidal intent. This interpretation is 
clearly evident in the concurring opinion offered by Judge Compton in the 
ruling of the appellate court. 
From an ethical point of view, autonomy is a crucial moral principle 
governing treatment decisions which respects the capacity for self-
direction inherent in the dignity of the individual patient. However, it 
seems to us that the construction of patient autonomy to include the 
capacity to inflict harm on oneself, and to include caregivers and health 
care providers in the provision of such harm, erodes the very meaning of 
patient autonomy into a notion of individual preference without 
appropriate checks and balances. 
View of Patient Autonomy 
At the very least, patient autonomy must be seen within the context of 
proper stewardship of the gift of life . While it is often difficult to know 
where to "draw the line" concerning decisions to with old or withdraw 
treatment, it seems to us that Judge Compton's view clearly crosses the line 
into euthanasia and endorsement of suicide. If such a view prevails , 
implications for societal well-being are indeed grave. Catholic health care 
providers should be careful to attend to both the legal and moral 
dimensions of judicial decisions such as Bouvia. , 
The Archbishop of Los Angeles , Roger Mahony, released a strong 
statement on the Bouvia ruling and its alarming "invitations to 
euthanasia".16 This statement, quite rightly, pointed out that the standard 
of determining the level of medical care provided should be the quality and 
proportionality of the treatment . not the life of the patient. It is morally 
acceptable to refuse treatment. including food , if that treatment "is a 
source of significant pain , discomfort , risk or even dehumanization added 
to what is already being experienced" .1 7 
On balance, then , we think that the question of foregoing artificial 
nutrition and hydration requires careful and prudential assessment. The 
quest for an absolute position on these measures beyond the traditional 
categories of " ordinary" or "extraordinary" means which invite persuasive 
moral argument is illusory and self-defeating. Father Richard McCormick 
S.J. , in his thoughtful essay on this topic, cautions that there is a great 
potential for abuse of the patient when considering the withdrawal of 
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artificial nourishment. Accordingly, we should err, if possible, on the side 
of life. I S 
What are the implications of this discussion for hospitals , especially 
Catholic facilities? Because of the legal and moral complexities , each case 
must be decided on its merits with the help oflegal and moral counsel when 
necessary. With this caveat in mind, the policy for providing or foregoing 
treatment must be consistent with both the applicable law within the 
hospital's jurisdiction and the moral principles of the institution. For 
example , since we are writing from the perspective of recent litigation in 
Southern California, some general treatment guidelines for consenting 
adult patients may look like the following: 
1. Providing ordinary care is legally and morally acceptable. 
2. Foregoing ordinary care in order to avoid the burden of the 
treatment is legally acceptable but morally unacceptable. 
3. Foregoing ordinary care in order to avoid the burden of one's life is 
legally acceptable but morally unacceptable. 
4. Foregoing ordinary care in order to end one's life is legally uncertain 
and morally unacceptable. 
5. Providing extraordinary care is legally and morally acceptable. 
6 . Foregoing extraordinary care in order to avoid the burden of the 
treatment is legally and morally acceptable. 
7. Foregoing extraordinary care in order to avoid the burden of one's 
life is legally acceptable but morally unacceptable. 
8. Foregoing extraordinary care in order to end one's life is legally 
uncertain and morally unacceptable. 
On the basis of the Bouvia decision , we make a distinction between the 
intent to avoid the burden of one's life (3 and 7) , and the intent to end one's 
life (4 and 8). The majority opinion clearly held that the former is legally 
acceptable. How the former is distinguishable from the latter was not, 
however, as clear. As mentioned above , Justice Compton quite accurately 
described the majority opinion as dancing around the issue' of suicide, and 
by doing so, left those of us facing these issues in our hospitals on uncertain 
legal ground. 
In the face of what promises to be a situation of continuing conflicts and 
some uncertainty, we wish to underscore our position that treatment 
decisions must be both legally and morally acceptable. Those of us in 
Catholic health care are no strangers to conflict in this area. It has long 
been legally acceptable to have an abortion or sterilization procedure , but 
because these treatments are not morally acceptable to us, we do not 
perform them. A similar position may have to be taken in regard to 
artificial nutrition and hydration if presented with a factual situation 
comparable to that which provided the basis for the decision in the Bouvia 
case. While there may be some circumstances which call for the removal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration in patients with a fatal pathology (as 
Father O'Rourke carefully points out) , we conclude that these 
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circumstances do not include the unwarranted intention of suicide 
apparent in the Bouvia decision . 
References 
I. /Jarhl'l" I 'S. SIII",rior COllrl. 147 Cal. Arr. 3d 1006. 
2. I hid. 
3. Ihid. 
4 . Ihid 
5. Harl lillg I ·S. SlIl'l'I"ior COllrl. 163 Ca I. A rr . 3d I X6. 
h. .lI lIl/l'I" o( COllror . 4Xh A. 2d 1209 . 
7. HOIII'ia 1',1. SIII",rior COllrl. Xh Dail\ ' Journal D .A. R . 131 7. 
X. Ihid 
9. Ihid 
10 . Va t ica n C o ng rega t ion ror the Doct ri ne or t he Fa i t h. /l ('e/llrt/l io ll Oil Fill hallllsia. June 
26. 19XO as ci ted in .I/out! NCSI,o lIsihililr i ll I 'rolo llgillg l .il" I ),ocisill//.\". cd ited hy Do na Id (j . 
McCartin' and Alhert S , MoraCle\\·ski. St. I. ouis: Pore J oh n Ce nt er. 19X I. rr . 290-297. 
See also. P residen t' s Co mmissioll ror the Studl' or Ethica l Prohlem s in Med icine and 
Bioll1 L'dical Research. I kcitliJl,l!. 10 F orego l.~il' - .\·IISI (fil1il1g l i'('{//I}/C'I1I. Washington. D .C.: 
U.S. (jOlwnment P rin t ing Orrice. Ma rc h. 19X3. 
II . O' R o urk e. Kel'in D .. and Dennis Brodeur. .1I('dim! Uhin: COJIIIIIC!II (jrolllldlil/' 
L'1Ie!l'I"SIlI IIe!illg. The Catholic Healt h Association or the lini ted States. St. I.ou is: Il) X6 . 
r. h9, 
12, Co mmitt ec ror Pro-I.i fe Actil·itie s. :"\ationa l Co nferc ncc or Ca th olic Bisho r s. 
SIIII (,IIIe'11I Oil ( 'lIilimll Nighls 0(11", 7"rJllillll/l, ' 1II .· IeI. Wa shingt on. D .C .. June. 19Xh. 
13. O·Rourke. Kel·in. UhicIII IsslI(,s ill I/(,lIlll, Car(,: 711(' ,·1.1/.·1 SIII/I'JII(,W Oil 7id", 
/-"('Ilillg: UhicIII .·I IIIII,-sis. St. I.oui s Unil'e rs it y Medica l Center. Center For Hcalth Carc 
Ethi cs . VII X. A rril . 19X6. 
14. Co mmittee ror Pro-I.ik Actil·ities. :'\ational Conkrc ncc or Ca th olic Bishors. 
Sill I I'll 1l'llI Oil ( 'lIilimll Nighls 0(11", 7,'rJllillllllr III ,· le l. Washington. D .C .. J unc. 19Xh. 
15. O·Ro urk e. Uhical IsslI(,s ill I/('(/ llh Cllrl'. oI'. cil. 
16. I:".rfl'Ilt/l'c/ S/a/l'IJll'1l1 hy A rchhisho!, /?uger .\/lIhOIlY Oil ,II(' l '1I1IIIinl01ls Ull lillg (~rf he 
Calililmill }1Ie! /lis lricl COllrl o( .·I /,/wIII olllh(' ('asl' o( Ui~ah(,lh HOIII·ill. Arc hd iocese or 
Los A ngeles. Arril. 19Xh. 
17, Ihie!. 
IX. McCo rm ick S .J .. Richard . "Caring or Stan'ing" The CaSL" o r C laire Co nro l"." 
AJIIl'I"ica 152 (Arril h. 19X5): 269-273. 
46 I.inacre Quarterly 
